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INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PARTNERS, POLITICS, AND
PROMISES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ARBITRAL PANEL DECISION
CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO TRUCKING
DISPUTE
STEPHEN T. WEISWEAVER"
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' has been called "the most
comprehensive trade agreement ever negotiated which creates the world's largest
integrated market for goods and services." 2 NAFTA provides the three signing
parties, the United States, Mexico, and Canada, various methods for resolving
disputes.3 Mexico and the United States have been disputing NAFTA obligations
concerning cross-border trucking services for several years. The dispute arises out
of the refusal by the United States to allow the Mexican trucking service industry
authority to operate within U.S. borders, although NAFTA provides that such
services shall be permitted.' Mexico requested the formation of an arbitral panel,
and that panel held in Cross-BorderTrucking that the United States was in violation
of several provisions of NAFTA.6 This Note provides a brief historical synopsis of
NAFTA in relation to the U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute and examines the panel's
rationale in rendering its decision. Next, this Note discusses the implications of the
panel's decision and the reaction of the United States to the decision.

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. Special thank you to Professor Franklin Gill
for his guidance, knowledge, and motivation while supervising my progression throughout the development of this
Note.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter
NAFTA].

2. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(1), pt.l, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552.
3. Chapter 20 of NAFTA is the process for settling the majority of disputes that may arise under the

agreement. Additionally, Chapter II deals with investment disputes, and Chapter 19 deals with subsidy and
dumping disputes. FOLSOM, GORDON, & SPONAGLE, HANDBOOK ON NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 2-7 to 2-8

(1998).
4. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (United States v. Mexico), USA-MEX-98-2008-0l (NAFTA
Arbitral Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/lpdf/ub9S010e.pdf [hereinafter
Cross-Border Trucking]. The panel members were J.Martin Hunter (Chair), Luis Miguel Diaz, David A. Gantz,
C. Michael Hathaway, and Alejandro Ogarrio. Panel members were selected under the provisions of NAFTA article
2011, paragraph I. See discussion infra part II.A. and note 14.
5. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 231, interpreting NAFTA Articles 1202, 1203 and Annex 1."A
person of Mexico will be permitted to obtain operating authority to provide[,].. .six years after the date of entry into
force of this Agreement, cross-border truck services." NAFTA Annex I-Schedule of the United States, Sector:
Transportation, Sub-Sector: Land Transportation, Phase-Out: Cross Border Services (c). "A person of Mexico will
be permitted to establish an enterprise in the United States to provide:.. .seven years after the date of entry into force
of this Agreement, bus services between points in the United States." NAFTA Annex I, Schedule of the United
States, Sector Transportation, Sub-Sector: Land Transportation, Phase-Out: Investment (b).
6. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 295. See infra part mIl.D.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Agreement
The United States, Mexico, and Canada began negotiations to create a "free trade
zone" on the North American continent in 1990. Presidents George H.W. Bush and
Carlos Salinas hailed NAFTA as the best means for attaining the agreed objectives
of a "vigorous economic relationship, maintaining sustained growth, and expanding
trade and investment between the two countries." 7 The agreement was completed
and signed by President Bush, President Salinas, and Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney in their respective capitals on December 17, 1992. At that time, Presidentelect William J. Clinton reaffirmed his support for NAFTA. 8 The U.S. Congress
then approved NAFTA by passing the NAFTA Implementation Act on December
8, 1993. 9
NAFTA created a "Free Trade Commission" composed of the trade ministers of
the three NAFTA governments, who have the responsibility of overseeing the
implementation of the agreement and resolving disputes."0 NAFTA chapter 20
allows parties to resolve disputes over the application and interpretation of the
Agreement. The chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanism is a three-step process that
begins with consultations between the two parties." If consultations fail, then the
complaining party may seek conciliation or mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission. 2 Finally, the complaining party may request an arbitral panel.' 3 The
panels are to provide the parties with an initial report, findings of fact, a
determination of the legal issues, and recommendations for resolution of the issues
in dispute.' 4 Parties can submit written comments to the initial report within fourteen
days. 5 The arbitral process ends with the issuance of a final report within thirty days
of the initial report. 6
B. The Moratorium
The United States currently has a blanket moratorium, or postponement, on
accepting applications from Mexican trucking firms wishing to operate within the
United States.'" This moratorium has been extended to include a refusal to allow
Mexican nationals to invest in U.S. trucking service companies. 8 The current ban

7. H.R. REP. No. 103-361 (1), at 5 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552, 2555.

8. H.R. REP. No. 103-361 (1), at 5 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552, 2557.
9. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, §§ 3301-3473 (1993), Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Star. 2057. The Implementation Act was passed by a vote of 234 to 200 in the House, and 61 to 38 in the
Senate. 139 CONG.REC. D1323-01 (Nov. 17, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. S16,712-01 (Nov. 20, 1993).
10. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001.
11. Id. art. 2006.
12. Id. art. 2007, 1.

13. NAFTA chapter 20 regulates dispute resolution and allows a party to bring forth a complaint against
another party. A panel is composed of five members. When there are two disputing parties, both parties agree to
the chair of the panel. Then each party selects two panelists who are citizens of the other party. Idt art. 2011, I.
14. Id. art. 2016.
15. Id.art.2016,

4.

16. Id.art. 2017,

1.

17. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4,
18. Id. 85-86.

3843.
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is a derivative of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982,"9 which was passed
partially in response to Mexico's refusal to allow U.S. trucking operators access to
its domestic market. Section 6(g) of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act imposed a twoyear moratorium suspending the issuance of new grants of operating authority to
motor carriers domiciled in, owned, or controlled by persons of Mexico or Canada.2"
Under this statute, the President has the authority to remove or modify the
moratorium.2 Shortly after implementation of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act, the
President lifted the moratorium with respect to Canadian trucking services.22 The
moratorium was not lifted against Mexico, however, predominately because of the
"almost complete inability of U.S. trucking interest to provide service into
Mexico. '' 23 The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 was
passed preserving the moratorium and the President's authority to modify or remove

The current Bush administration has made it agoal to lift the ban and comply
with NAFTA's requirements. 25 Recently the U.S. Congress passed the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) 2002 appropriations bill, which contains
provisions that will eventually allow Mexican trucks to cross the border.26 President
Bush signed the appropriations bill into law on December 18, 2001.27 Currently
there exists some speculation as to when the DOT will comply with these provisions
and begin to process Mexican trucks.2" Therefore the moratorium is still in effect as
of the writing of this Note.
it.'

19. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 § 6, 49 U.S.C. § 10922(m) (1994), Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat.
1102 (1982). Exceptions to the Moratorium existed from the outset. Approximately 150 Mexican-domiciled carriers
with United States majority ownership, five Mexican-domiciled and owned carriers grand-fathered under United
States law, and one Mexican-domiciled and owned carrier transiting the United States to reach Canada are allowed
to operate freely within the United States. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 254. In addition, Mexican carriers
are allowed to operate within the United States commercial zones, generally defined as an approximate radius of
20 miles around U.S. cities located on the border of Mexico. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, M 45-48. See
also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. TR-2000-013, REPORT ON MEXICO-DOMICILED

MOTOR CARRIERS, at 1-2 (1999).
20. 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (m) (1994), Pub. L. No. 97-261 § 6(g), 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
21. Id.
22. Memorandum of the President, Determination Under the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Sept. 20,
1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,721 (Sept. 22, 1982).
23. Id. See also Interstate Commerce Commission Notice of Policy Statement, Passenger Operations by
Mexican Motor Carriers-Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 59 Fed. Reg. 1,406 (Jan.
10, 1994).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(4)(B), Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 103, 109 Stat. 803, 883 (1995).
25. See Memorandum; Determination Under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995,
66 Fed. Reg. 30,799 (June 6, 2001), available at http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06120010606I.html. See also Joint Statement by President George Bush and President Vincente Fox Towards a Partnership for
Prosperity: The Guanajuato Proposal, 37 PUB. PAPERS 8 (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/02/20010220-2.html.
26. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-87, §350,
115 Stat. 833,864 (2001).
27. See Statement on Signing the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2001 WL 1614120 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/2001 11218-4.html.
28. See GAO Report Says Mexican Truck Safety Still Lags; DOT Still Lacks Safety Plan, Permanent
Inspection Facilities, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 10, 2002 available at http://www.trucksafety.org/gaoreport.html; Border
to Open by June, TRANSPORT TOPICS, Jan. 7, 2002, at http://www.ttnews.com%5c/members/topNews/0008347
.html; House Votes to Allow Mexican Trucks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponine/national/AP-Mexican-Trucks.html.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The reservations the United States made in NAFTA negotiations to maintain the
moratorium on Mexican cross-border trucking services and investment, under
Annex I of NAFTA, expired on December 17, 1995.29 On December 18 of that year
the U.S. Secretary of Transportation issued a press release stating the United States
would not finalize Mexican trucking applications.3" This refusal to finalize
applications effectively continued the moratorium on Mexican trucks that had
previously been submitted. 3 However, the United States currently processes
applications from Canadian trucking firms to operate in the United States in the
same manner as U.S. trucking firms.3 2 Because of the disparity in treatment, and the
provisions agreed to under NAFTA, Mexico ultimately requested arbitration in front
of an international panel established under NAFTA guidelines.
The issue before the NAFTA panel was whether the United States, by failing to
lift its moratorium on the processing of applications by Mexican-owned trucking
firms, is in breach of NAFTA provisions governing national treatment33 and most
favored-nation treatment34 for cross-border services.35 Similarly the panel needed to
decide whether the United States breached portions of NAFTA that govern the
national treatment3 6 and most favored-nation treatment of investments37 by refusing
to permit Mexican investment in companies in the United States that provide motor
carrier services. The panel also reviewed whether any reservations or exceptions to
the Agreement existed that justified the actions of the United States.38
A. The Dispute
On December 18, 1995, Mexico sent a letter to the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) requesting consultations, pursuant to NAFTA
Article 2006, regarding the refusal of the United States to allow Mexican trucking
firms to provide cross-border trucking services into the United States.39 On January
19, 1996, consultations were held between the United States and Mexico, and the

dispute was not resolved.' On January 24, 1998, Mexico requested a meeting with
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission under Article 2007. 4'

29. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 68.
30. Id. 77. See also Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Delays Giving Mexican Trucks Freer Travel in the U.S.
Border States, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A 10; Helene Cooper, Shift into Reverse: Ban on Mexican Trucks in U.S.
Interior Shows Rise of Protectionism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at Al.
31. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 77.
32. Id. 39.
33. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1202, 1 ("Each Party shall accord to service providers of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own service providers.").
34. Id. art. 1203 ("Each Party shall accord to service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to service providers of another Party or of a non-Party.").
35. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 1.
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102, 1 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors....").
37. Id. art. 1103, 1 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party....").
38. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 1100.
39. Id. 15.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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On August 19, 1998, a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission took
place, and again the parties were unable to resolve the dispute.42 Finally, on
September 22, 1998, Mexico requested the formation of an arbitral panel to hear the
dispute under Article 2008(1) of the Agreement, and the panel issued its initial
report on November 29, 2000."3 That report, which is the topic of this Note, was
released on February 6, 2001."
B. Mexico's Argument
Mexico called for arbitration, alleging that the United States had agreed to phase
out its moratorium on cross-border trucking and bus services and on investment in
enterprises established in the United States that provide such services.45 Mexico
contended that the United States failed to comply with NAFTA, which establishes
two provisions requiring the ban to be lifted. The first provision obligates each
NAFTA party to accord national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to
service providers and investors of another party.' The second provision requires the
elimination of reservations from the national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment obligation for trucking and bus services, and investment in providers
of
47
those services in accordance with the schedules set out in the reservations.
The United States argued that Mexico's trucking industry did not operate in "like
circumstances" as the U.S. trucking industry because of differences that existed in
each party's regulatory system.48 In response, Mexico contended that NAFTA does
not entitle a party to impose its own laws and regulations on another party.49
Therefore, Mexico argued it was under no obligation to enforce U.S. trucking
regulatory standards within Mexico.5" Mexico stated that the United States
committed to NAFTA while both the Mexican and U.S. governments were fully
aware that their respective standards for motor carrier regulations were not
identical.5 Therefore Mexico argued that the lack of a domestic carrier safety
regulation system comparable to that of the United States is not a valid justification
for the refusal to allow Mexico to furnish cross-border motor carrier service.52
Mexico asserted the refusal on the part of the United States to process Mexican
motor carrier applications is a denial of national treatment because the operating
authority for U.S. carriers is considered on a case-by-case basis.53 Mexico also
contended it is being denied most-favored nation treatment because the United
States processes Canadian motor carriers with none of the restrictions imposed on

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. 102 (citing Mexico's Initial Submission at 61, Feb. 14, 2000).
46. Id. (As of the time of the writing of this Note, Mexico's submissions were not available to the public;
however, presumably Mexico is referring to NAFTA Articles 1202 and 1203.).
47. Id. (presumably referring to NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103.).
48. See infra part III.C.
49. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 109.
50. Id. 109 (citing Mexico's Initial Submission at 83-85, Feb. 14, 2000).
51. Id. I 1i.
52. Id. 113 (citing Mexico's Initial Submission al 75, Feb. 14, 2000).
53. Id. 117.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 32

Mexican carriers.' Therefore Mexico contended that a complete ban on Mexican
carriers is a violation of NAFTA because it fails to give Mexican carriers an
opportunity to comply with U.S. standards."
C. U.S. Contentions
In response, the United States argued that the Mexican regulatory system lacked
core components for safety procedures and a substantial commitment to enforcement
resources and personnel.56 The United States claimed the significant differences in
regulatory systems and the safety compliance record of Mexican trucks operating
in the U.S. border zone57 provided the basis for its decision to delay processing
Mexican carriers' applications for operating authority until further progress was
made on cooperative safety efforts.58 The United States claimed that such a decision
was both prudent and consistent with its obligations under NAFTA and was not in
violation of the articles of NAFTA concerning national and most-favored nation
treatment.5 9 The United States claimed Mexico's trucking services were not within
the same circumstances because of differences in the parties' regulatory systems of
the trucking industry.' The United States justified its actions on the grounds that the
Mexican trucking service regulatory system was substantially different from that of
the United States.6 The United States claimed that the Mexican safety regime lacks
essential components, such as comprehensive truck equipment standards, fully
functioning roadside inspections and onsite compliance reviews, strict recordkeeping rules, and a substantial commitment of enforcement resources and
personnel.62 Therefore, the United States argued similar treatment was not an
obligation under NAFTA.63
The United States also claimed it was not obligated to grant. Mexican trucking
firms operating authority when no adequate regulatory measures existed in Mexico
to ensure compliance with U.S. highway safety regulations.' The United States
asserted it was proper for a NAFTA party to treat service providers differently in
order to address legitimate regulatory objectives.65 The United States further alleged
it could not assure Mexican carrier safety on a case-by-case basis.' It argued
highway safety could only be assured by a comprehensive and integrated safety
regime within Mexico.67 The United States indicated that it could not practically

54. Id. 119.
55. Id. 7t9 102-52.
56. Id. 1 153-57.
57. Id. 1 45-54. (Currently Mexican trucks can operate within a commercial zone located within the U.S.
Border States.). See supra note 19.
58. Id. 153 (citing U.S. Post-Hearing Submission at 2-3, June 9, 2000).
59. Id. 154 (citing U.S. Counter-Submission at 2, Feb. 23, 2000).
60. Id. 4Nf159-60.
61. Id. f 153-60.
62. Id.
63. Id. 154 (citing U.S. Counter-Submission at 2, Feb. 23, 2000).
64. Id. 154.
65. Id. 161 (citing U.S. Counter-Submission at 35, Feb. 23, 2000).
66. Id. 1155.
67. Id.
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inspect every truck as it crosses the U.S.-Mexico border." Therefore, the United
States was not obligated to provide similar treatment of Mexican trucks under
NAFTA.69
D. PanelDecision
The panel determined that the blanket refusal by the United States to review and
consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier applications for authority to
provide cross-border trucking services is a breach of U.S. obligations under
NAFTA.7 ° The panel determined that the differences of the Mexican regulatory
system from that of the United States did not provide sufficient legal basis for the
United States to maintain a moratorium on the consideration of applications for U.S.
operating authority from all Mexican-owned trucking service providers." The panel
also determined the United States is in breach of its obligations under NAFTA to
permit Mexican nationals to invest in enterprises in the United States that provide
transportation of international cargo within the United States.72
IV. RATIONALE
The panel recommended that the United States take appropriate steps to bring its
practices into compliance with NAFTA. 73 Essentially the panel found that it is a
violation of the terms of NAFTA for the United States to have a blanket refusal not
allowing cross border trucking services or investments by Mexican nationals in U.S.
trucking companies.74 The panel found that compliance by the United States does
not require the United States to give favorable consideration to all or any specific
number of applications from Mexican-owned trucking firms when it is evident that
a particular applicant may be unable to comply with U.S. trucking regulations when
operating in the United States. 7' The panel determined that the United States is not
required to treat applications from Mexican trucking firms in exactly the same
manner as applications from U.S. or Canadian firms as long as they are reviewed on
a case-by-case basis.'
The panel recognized that U.S. authorities are responsible for the safe operation
of trucks within its territory whether the trucks are U.S., Canadian, or Mexican. 77 It
therefore reasoned that it is not unreasonable for the United States to conclude that
inspection and licensing requirements for Mexican trucks may not be exactly similar
to those applied to U.S. trucks. 78 The panel indicated that the United States could
justify the use of different methods to ensure compliance with U.S. regulatory

68. Id. 155 (citing U.S. Post-Hearing Submission at 4, June 9,2000). See infra note 124 and accompanying
text.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. IN 153-94.
Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 1295.
Id. 1296.
Id. 297.
Id. 299.
Id. 4N 295-97.
Id. 300.
Id.

77. Id.

78. Id. 301.
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standards.79 However, if the United States decided to impose different requirements
for Mexican carriers than those imposed on U.S. and Canadian carriers the
requirements must abide by the following guidelines: (1) the requirements must be
made in good faith with respect to legitimate safety concerns and (2) the United
States must implement requirements that fully conform to all of the NAFTA
provisions."0
V. ANALYSIS
The panel ruled correctly because one of the goals of NAFTA is to facilitate the
trade of goods and services among its parties. A blanket refusal by the United States
to consider any Mexican trucking firms on an individual basis was clearly different
from the treatment given to U.S. and Canadian trucking firms. In addition, the
United States could not provide any adequate justification for the refusal to allow
Mexican individuals to invest in the U.S. trucking industry.
A. Interpretationof NAFTA
The panel declined to examine any possible U.S. political motivations to continue
the moratorium on cross-border trucking services.8 ' Although faced with legitimate
safety concerns, the decision to continue the ban on Mexican carriers by the Clinton
administration was arguably motivated by various political considerations.8 2 Staunch
opposition continued after the panel issued its opinion. 3 Opponents to allowing
Mexican trucks operating authority into the United States have added national
security concerns, in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, to their arsenal of critiques against complying with the panel's ruling 4
Much speculation existed that Mexico originally faced its own domestic pressures
against resolving the border dispute." These contentions may be somewhat
overshadowed by recent demonstrations and lawsuits by Mexican carriers favoring
entrance to the U.S. trucking market.8 6 Currently, many of the opponents of

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. 214.
82. Opposition to opening the border came from a variety of organizations including the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and members of Congress. See Peter J. Cazamias, Comment, The U.S.-Mexican Trucking
Dispute: A Product of a Politicized Trade Agreement, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ., 349, 352-55 (1998).
83. See Examine Safety of Cross Border Trucking and Bus Operations, Adequacy of Resources, Impact on
U.S. Communities, Businesses, Employees and Environment, Application of U.S. Laws to Operations: Hearing of
the S. Commerce, Sci. and Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. 41-46 (2001) (statements of James P. Hoffa, General
President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen). See also Many
Mexican Drivers Fear NAFTA's Effect, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, Aug. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.teamster.org/0lnewsbhn%5F010817%5F.htm.
84. See U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) Holds Hearing on Bus and Truck Security and Hazardous
Materials Licensing: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Surface Transp. and Merch. Marines, 107th Cong. 38
(2001) (testimony of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, available at http://www.citizen.org/autosafety/
Truck_Safety/articles.cfm.?ID=6261.
85. See Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Protests Border Action, J. COMMERCE, Dec. 20, (1995), at IA; Cazamias,
supra note 82, at 353-54.
86. loan Grillo, Truckers Continue to Grapple with U.S. Controls, THE NEWS MEXICO.COM, (Jan. 31, 2002)
at http://www.thenewsmexico.com/noticiahist.asp?id= 18186. See also Mexican Truckers Block Border Bridges,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Dec. 11, 2001). available at http://ooida.com/atissue/NAFTA/Mex_trks_blk_bdr.html.

Summer 2002]

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

complying with the NAFTA panel's recommendations have subdued their anticompliance rhetoric in light of the compromise reached between Congress and the
current administration. 7 Despite the mass of political issues surrounding the dispute,
the panel limited their inquiry to whether the U.S. moratorium was consistent with
its obligations under NAFTA. s8 The panel pointed out that this is consistent with the
practice of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, which had
reviewed cases in the past without inquiring into the political motivations of the
parties and
solely addressed the actions of the parties that affect the respective
89
treaties.
The panel established that the Agreement must be considered as a whole,
especially emphasizing the proclaimed objectives of the Agreement, when
interpreting the parties' claims and assertions.90 The panel correctly indicated that
Article 102, defining the objectives of the Agreement, states that the objectives are
to "eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement of, goods
and services between the territories of the parties."'" The panel additionally pointed
out that the Agreement specifies, "The Parties shall interpret and apply the
provisions of this Agreement in light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in
accordance with applicable rules of international law." 92 It was then concluded that
interpreting the Agreement in this manner fully complied with the practices of
international law established in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.93 The panel pointed out that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 31(1) provides that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of the treaty's object and purpose.' The context for the purpose of the
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text including its
preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the agreement made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.95
The same interpretation standards for the Agreement have been adopted by earlier
NAFTA arbitral panels such as In re Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. 96
OriginAgricultural Products,
which indicated that the objectives of eliminating
barriers to trade and facilitating movement of goods and services should be

87. A Victory for Highway Safety; Statement by JamesP. Hoffa on Cross-BorderTrucking Legislation,PR
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 29, 2001, available at http://findarticles.comlcf.O/m4PRN/2001_Nov_ 29 /80 60 0 3 7 9 /pl/
article.jhtml; Statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, Compromise on Mexican Trucks Is a Major
Step Forward, but Implementation Must Be Carefully Monitored (Nov. 30 2001), available at http:/www.
citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ED=946.
88. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 214.
89. Id.
90. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, IN 216-18.
91. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 102 91; Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 217.
92. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 102 2; Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 218.
93. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 220.
94. Id.
95. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, N 220-24 (The panel clearly establishes authority for its position,
citing the Vienna Convention, the International Court of Justice, and numerous secondary sources.).
96. In re Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products IN118-24 (United States
v. Canada), CDA-95-2008-01 (NAFTA Arbitral Panel Dec. 2, 1996), available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/english/index.htm [hereinafter In Re Tariffs].
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promoted when interpreting the Agreement.97 This interpretation is consistent with
the findings of arbitral panels under NAFTA's predecessor, the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)98 , and the interpretation of other international
arbitral bodies. The International Center For Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), which can review NAFTA investment disputes arising under Chapter I1 ,"
also concluded that the interpretation of any NAFTA dispute should keep in mind
the overall objectives of the agreement in Metalclad v. United Mexican States."o

The ICSID arbitral body found the overall objectives of NAFTA to be a key factor
in the interpretation of the Agreement and a key factor in their decision.''
An alternative view suggests the panel should look only at the disputed portion
of an agreement when resolving any interpretation disputes.' A Canadian court
reviewing Metalclad on appeal reasoned that the agreement should be interpreted

by its individual chapters.'0 3 Additionally, a somewhat controversial "clarification"

released by the Free Trade Commission"04 has left the issue unclear. The panel did
establish, however, that the majority of international arbitral bodies interpret

international agreements in a manner consistent with the overall objectives of the

97. Id. 122. Notably, only a small number of trade disputes have reached the final arbitral stage despite
the large amount of trade fostered by the Agreement. As of the writing of this note, the NAFTA Secretariat
homepage shows only three disputes that have reached the final report state. The first two are Cross-Border
Trucking and In re Tariffs; the third is In re United States Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn Brooms from
Mexico (Mexico v. United States), USA-97-2008-O (NAFTA Arbitral Panel 1998). Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel
Reports, at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htmCcnafta2O.
98. Much of NAFTA was modeled after the CFTA, which entered into force on January 1, 1989. See 27
1.L.M. 293. The CFTA resulted in five Arbitral Panel Decisions under chapter 18 of the CFTA. See The
Interpretation of and Canada's Compliance with Article 701.3 with Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, CDA-92-180701, VU14-18 (Feb. 8, 1992); Treatment Of Non-Mortgage Interest Under Article 304, USA-92-1807-01, 127 (June
8, 1992), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.orglenglishldecisions/ftalindex.htm#ftal8. Two of the five
decisions reached the same conclusion considering the interpretation of international agreements. Id. The other three
opinions did not address the matter.
99. NAFTA Chapter I I covers investments and indicates an individual bringing a claim against a NAFTA
party may submit a claim to arbitration under ICSD or the United Nation's UNCITRAL. NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 1120.
100. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), available athttp://www.worldbank.orgicsid/cases/awards.htm.
The case consisted of a company that brought a NAFrA investment dispute against the Mexican Government and
chose the ICSID as the arbitral mechanism as allowed in NAFTA Article 1120.
101. Id. 70.
102. See The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, K 71-72 (2001).
103. The Supreme Court of British Columbia differed on the interpretation issue stating the agreement should
be interpreted by individual chapter. The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, J 71-72
(2001).
104. Free Trade Commission Clarification Related to NAFTA Chapter I1,B.3, released July 31, 2001,
available at http://ustr.gov/regions/whemispherenafta.shtml ("A determination that there has been a breach of
another provision of the NAFIA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been
a breach of Article 1105(1)."). The confusion arises as to whether the statement indicates only disputes concerning
article 1105 should be interpreted in isolation of the remainder of the Agreement, or if the entire Agreement should
be interpreted in such a manner. Concerning the established principles of international law to interpret an agreement
in a manner most consistent with furthering its overall objectives, and the relative ineffectiveness resulting from
interpreting any agreement by piecemeal during a dispute, one may safely assume the FTC did not intend for this
statement to apply to the interpretation of the entire NAFTA; however, the confusion as of now still remains to be
clarified via further FTC commentary.
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agreement. °5 Such a mode of interpretation has been recognized as a generally
accepted principle of international law."°
The panel correctly indicated the Agreement should be interpreted as a whole
emphasizing the objectives stated in Article 102. This is apparent given the
historical background concerning the interpretation of international treaties under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties referenced in the opinion. This type
of interpretation is also well established by several arbitral bodies that have issued
opinions on NAFTA disputes."°
B. Services
The principle issue surrounding the dispute concerning services was based largely
on the parties' interpretation of NAFTA Articles 1202 (national treatment for crossborder services) and 1203 (most-favored nation treatment for cross border
services). 8 The panel established that the maintenance of the moratorium needed
to be justified under the language of 1202, 1203, or some other NAFTA provision
such as Chapter Nine's standard related measures or Article 2101 on general
exceptions.'" The United States based its argument on the wording of Articles 1202
and 1203."0 It contended that the Mexican regulatory system did not meet the "in
like circumstances" wording because of the significant difference in standards
between the parties' regulatory systems. "'! The United States contended the
moratorium was not a violation of national treatment since the Mexican regulatory
system was "not like" that of the U.S. system."'"1 2 The United States claimed the
Canadian regulatory system was "equivalent" to the U.S. regulatory system and
therefore the moratorium against Mexico is not a violation of the "most favored
nation" provisions." 3 The panel correctly narrowed the services issue down to the
interpretation of the "in like circumstances" language of Articles 1202 and 1203. '
The panel looked at the historical definition of "in like circumstances" language
for most favored nation treatment established in the CFTA' ' and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." 6 The panel established that the GATT
and CFTA language of "in like circumstances" has been interpreted narrowly and
that a broad interpretation could render Articles 1202 and 1203 meaningless,
essentially defeating the overall objectives of the agreement stated in Article 102."'

105. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1986).

107. See supra notes 95-98, 100.
108. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 241.
109. Id.NAFTA allows a party to apply measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
"not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to health and safety and consumer
protection." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2101, 2.
110. See discussion supra part III C.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 242. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened
for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
114. Id. 247.
115. Supranote98.

116. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 91250-51.
117. Id. 259-60.
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The panel explained that if "the regulatory systems in two NAFTA countries must
be substantially identical before national treatment is granted, relatively few service
industry providers could ultimately qualify."' " Therefore, the panel concluded that
the United States contention that the "in like circumstances" language permits a
continuation of the moratorium was an overly broad reading of the clause, which
resulted in a breach of NAFTA obligations."'
The panel also said that the departure from national treatment and most favored
nation treatment was not justified under NAFTA article 2101. 20 The panel indicated
that the moratorium "must not be arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade."'' The United States has failed to demonstrate that
there are no alternative means of achieving U.S. safety goals that are more consistent
with NAFTA.
The panel found that rather than barring all Mexican applicants, the U. S.
Department of Transportation should be examining Mexican companies on a caseby-case basis to see whether they meet U.S. motor carrier safety standards.' 22 The
panel essentially stated the United States is entitled to set its own safety standards
and ensure Mexican drivers meet them as long as they are made in good faith with
respect to legitimate safety concerns and conform to all relevant NAFTA
provisions."'
The United States has some valid safety concerns resulting from the differences
between the U.S. and Mexican regulatory systems.'24 The U.S. General Accounting
Office recently highlighted the difficulties surrounding complying with the NAFTA
agreement and satisfying U.S. safety concerns. I" The United States can properly
address these issues by enforcing its safety standards in a nondiscriminatory manner
that is equivalent to the treatment accorded to domestic carriers. However, the panel
correctly found these differences do not justify a blanket moratorium from
considering the compliance to U.S. safety regulations by Mexican carriers on an
individual basis. Additionally the panel correctly ruled the in like circumstances
distinction should be interpreted narrowly in order to foster one of the overall
objectives of the agreement, which is to facilitate the cross-border movement of
services. 12

118. Id. 259
119. Id. 'M 259, 278
120. Id. 278.
121. Id. 269.
122. Jd. 300.
123. ld. 301.
124. The Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General has issued a series of reports beginning
in 1998 describing these issues. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REP. No. TR-1999-034,
MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL TRUCKS AT U.S. BORDERS (1998); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR

GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REP. No. TR-2000-013, REPORT ON MEXICO-DOMICILED MOTOR CARRIERS, 1-2
(1999); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'TOFTRANSP., REP. NO. MH-2001-059, INTERIM REPORT ON STATUS
OF IMPLEMENTING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT'S CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING PROVISIONS

(2001).
125. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COORDINATED OPERATIONAL PLAN NEEDED TO ENSURE MEXICAN
TRUCKS' COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. STANDARDS, GAO-020238 (2001).

126. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102,

1(a).
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C. Investments
The panel also found that the U.S. ban on Mexican individuals from investing in
U.S. trucking firms was a breach of NAFTA chapter eleven "national treatment" and
"most-favored nation" obligations.2' The NAFTA Annex I indicates that the
U.S.
moratorium on cross border trucking services not only covers cross border operating
authority but restricts Mexican investments in U.S. trucking services. 2 ' Annex I also
indicated such restrictions would be phased out by December 18, 1995.' 9 The
United States claimed it had not violated any Chapter Eleven obligations because
Mexico had not shown "any interest on behalf of Mexican nationals to invest in U.S.
trucking frms.'

30

The United States therefore alleged that Mexico failed to

establish a prima facie case of violation by the United States of its Chapter Eleven
obligations. 3 ' Nevertheless, the panel indicated that Mexico had made a prima facie
showing that the ban on investments violates articles 1102 and 1103.132 The panel
mentions the GATT and WTO holdings that "where a measure is inconsistent with
a party's obligations, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that the measure has had an
impact on trade."' 33 Also, "it is well-established that parties may challenge measures
mandating action inconsistent with the GATT regardless of whether the measures
have actually taken effect."'IM "A claim may be made for a violation even if an
injury has not yet been suffered."' 3 Therefore, the panel correctly concluded that
the United States should lift restrictions on Mexican investment in U.S. trucking
36
firms engaged in the transportation of international cargo.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
One of the questions resulting from the decision of the arbitral panel is whether
their decision is enforceable. What measures can Mexico take if the United States
fails to comply with the decision and what would be the impact on future trade
agreements?
A. Lack of Ultimate Enforceabilityof Chapter20 Disputes
Essentially the Chapter 20 dispute resolution process ultimately circles back to
negotiations between the two parties. NAFTA Articles 2018 and 2019 provide that
the United States and Mexico should have agreed upon a resolution that conforms
with the determinations and recommendations of the panel within thirty days of
receiving the final report, 37 which would have been approximately March 8, 2001.

127. Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, at 294.

128. "The moratorium has the effect of being an investment restriction because enterprises of the United
States providing bus or truck services that are owned or controlled by persons of Mexico may not obtain ICC
operating authority." NAFTA Annex L schedule of the United States.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 1282 (citing U.S. Counter-Submission at 55, Feb. 23, 2000).
Id. 283.
Id. 291.
Id. 289.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902 cmt. b. (1986).
Cross-BorderTrucking, supra note 4, 11 294, 297, 302.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019, 1.
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The parties are required to agree on a resolution to the dispute that "normally shall
conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel."' 3 8 The
complaining party may seek suspension of the other party's equivalent NAFTA
benefits if the parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement within thirty
days after the panel releases its final report."l 9 If the complaining party determines
that suspension in the same sector would be ineffective, then that party may suspend
benefits in another sector."4 However, this is the extent of the express enforcement
measures of a final panel decision authorized under Chapter 20.
This results in some criticism of the NAFTA panel's role as an arbitral body.
Panel decisions have been described as more in the nature of recommendations to
affected governments, which only play a "facilitating role" that falls "short of
authoritatively resolving the dispute."'' Part of the problem is that a panel's
determinations have no direct effect on the domestic laws of the parties. 42 Arguably,
the United States government is not technically bound by the findings or
recommendations of the panel. Such a contention is based on the argument that
NAFTA is not a constitutionally ratified treaty. 14 Others contend that the agreement
is valid as a Congressional-Executive agreement. " Opponents of NAFTA attempted
to resolve the dispute by having the agreement declared unconstitutionally void in
Made in the USA Foundationv. United States,145 and the Eleventh Circuit held the
issue presents a nonjusticable political question."4 The American Law Institute's
Restatementon ForeignRelationsLaw of the United States indicates, "International
law and international agreements of the United Sates are law of the United States
and supreme over the law of the several States."' 147 The Restatement is supported by
dictum in Made in the USA, which provides an abbreviated explanation of the
constitutional authority for a Congressional-Executive agreement and concludes,
"With respect o NAFTA, it is especially important to note that the Supreme Court
has long since recognized the power of the political branches to conclude

138. id. art. 2018, 1.
139. Id. art. 2019, 1.
140. Id. art. 2019, 2(b).
141. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers in International Trade: Decision Making and Dispute
Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay on Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357, 378-79
(1997) (discussing criticisms of the NAFTA panel's role as an arbitral body).
142. See, e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (1993) ("No provision of the
Agreement, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstances, which is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect." 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (a)(1), 102(a) (2002)).
143. Most proponents of this argument agree that a Treaty is the Supreme law of the land under the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The debate is centered on the fact that Article 2, section 2 of the
Constitution requires treaties to be approved by two thirds of the Senate. The NAFTA Implementation Act was not
passed by two thirds of the Senate. See supra note 9.
144. For an overview of the distinction between a constitutionally ratified treaty and Congressional-Executive
agreement, see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995);
Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate, and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143
(1997).
U.S.
145. 242 F.3d 1300 (1 th Cir. 2001), cert denied sub nom, United Steel Workers v. United States, __,

122 S.Ct. 613 (2001).

146. Id. at 1311-12.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I 11 (1) cmt.d (1986)
("International agreements of the United States other than treaties.... and customary international law are also
federal law and as such are supreme over State law.").
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international 'agreements that do not constitute treaties in the constitutional
sense.'" 48 Additionally, under the fundamental principles of international law,
"every state has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under
international
agreements."' 49 Therefore, the threat to a breaching party's reputation in the
international community cannot be discounted.
A related criticism of the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism is the claim that
the ultimate resolution of a dispute depends upon the bargaining power between the
parties. 5 ° The only sanctions that may be imposed against a party for noncompliance are provisions whereby Mexico could suspend NAFTA benefits for
failure of the United States to comply. 5 ' The bargaining power has been described
as coming from "extralegal sources, such as the relative political and economic
strengths of the parties, and settlements are more likely to depart from treaty
norms."' 52 This may result in compelling a weaker political or economic party to
accept a compromise not fully reflective of its legal rights under the agreement. This
may end in an ineffective result if the disadvantaged party is dissatisfied with the
outcome of the dispute.
In this particular case, Mexico is at a disadvantage to negotiate with the United
States to comply with the panel's decision. The agreement indicates that benefits in
the same field should be suspended. This is not much of a threat to U.S. interests
since the United States is not currently engaged in cross border trucking into
Mexico. The United States therefore has little incentive to implement the panel's
recommendations with the exception of Mexico attempting to suspend additional
NAFTA trade benefits under Article 2019. "' Since Mexico gains economically from
these trade benefits, it leaves little incentive for the United States other than internal
political pressures and the danger of tarnishing their international reputation,
because Mexico arguably has relatively little economic bargaining power to
encourage the United States to comply. This ultimately may result in Mexico
entering an agreement that does not meet its full legal entitlement via NAFTA and
the arbitral panel decision, and thereby could discredit the NAFTA process
altogether.
A second criticism of the NAFTA dispute resolution process is that the lack of
enforceability of an arbitral panel decision creates an environment in which
domestic politics may hamper the settlement and/or compliance process. 114 Politics
have arguably been a large factor in the decision on the part of the United States to
withhold lifting the moratorium.' 55 It has been pointed out that the effectiveness of
Chapter 20 depends on the parties agreeing to adhere closely to NAFTA's
148. Made in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1313.
149. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 GAOR, Supp. (Nov. 28) 121, 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). Several U.S. cases have
noted the importance of recognizing international law. See e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law.").
150. See, David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes under the NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement, 34 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 407, 427 (1993).
151. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019, 12(b).
152. Huntington, supra note 150, at 427.
153. NAFFA, supra note 1, art. 2019, 1 2(b).
154. Huntington, supra note 150, at 429.
155. See infra note 158.
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substantive provisions.156 Any party's failure to comply with a panel decision sets
a precedent for essentially nullifying the Chapter 20 process. The failure by the
United States to comply with this panel's decision can pose the danger of
undermining the legitimacy of the Agreement, which can lead to less compliance by
the other parties and can ultimately result in a hollow Agreement.
B. The U.S. Reaction
Recently President Bush signed public law 107-87, which by all accounts will
allow the U.S. Department of Transportation to comply eventually with its NAFTA
obligations concerning cross-border trucking services. 5 7 This bill was the result of
several months of compromise on the issue within both bodies of the U.S.
Congress.5 8 Both the House and Senate had originally proposed bills that would
continue the moratorium after the panel had issued its final report.' 59 This indicates
the volatility of complying with an international agreement's arbitral panel decision
under U.S. political pressures. At the writing of this Note, much speculation still
exists on when the DOT will be in a position to begin fulfilling its NAFTA
6
obligations under the circumstances attached to the appropriations bill." Some
lawmakers, such as Senator John McCain of Arizona, feared that the agreed-upon
provisions may still result in breaching the obligations agreed to under NAFTA and
were not entirely persuaded until the current administration assured them the
compromise would not breach current NAFTA obligations.'6 ' Senator McCain also

156. Huntington, supra note 150, at 427.
157. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107-87, § 350,
115 Stat. 833, 864, (2001). Section 350, titled "Safety of Cross-Border Trucking Between United States and
Mexico," attaches particular provisions to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration prior to the processing
of Mexican motor carrier applications for authority to operate within the United States beyond the commercial
zones. Id. These provisions include a mandatory compliance review of Mexican trucking firms before being granted
operating authority, mandatory on-site inspections for Mexican trucking firms owning four or more commercial
vehicles, the inspection of at least half of all traffic volume entering the United States, and electronic verification
of Mexican drivers' commercial licenses during the required border safety inspections and all vehicles transporting
hazardous materials. Id. See also "Transportation Budget Fueled By $59.6 Billion," AMERICAN TRUCKING
ASSOCIATIONS TRUCKLINE, 2002, available at http://www.truckline.comlegislative/010202_transportationbudget
.html.
158. 147 CONG. REC. S12332 (Dec. 4, 2001) (Statement of Sen. Murray), 147 CONG. REC. H8735 (Nov. 30,
2001) (Statement of Rep. Rogers).
159. The following statements were made by members of Congress regarding the moratorium:
Again, this year, there was an attempt to prohibit Mexican trucks from operating beyond the
border commercial zone. I have said all along that this is really an issue about certain
protectionist interests trying to block Mexican trucks from the Untied States highways under the
guise of truck safety... .Although I do not think that this final compromise is perfect, I am a
realist and am pleased that this conference report will allow Mexican trucks to enter all areas in
the United States. We have made a step forward today toward treating our Mexican friends with
the respect they deserve.
147 CONG. REC. H8740 (Nov. 30, 2001) (statement of Rep. Kolbe); "As my colleagues well know, provisions in
both the House and the Senate version of Transportation appropriations bill proposed to restrict the administration's
ability to abide by our obligations under NAFTA." 147 CONG. REC. S12335-12336 (Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of
Sen. McCain)); "The House of Representatives had a provision that actually prohibited the Mexican trucks from
coming into this country beyond the 20-mile limit." 147 CONG. REC. S12335 (Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Dorgan).
160. See supra note 28.
161. 147 CONG. REC. S12336 (Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("Upon hearing of the agreement
with respect to Mexican trucks last week, I raised reservations over some of the provisions that I felt could be
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indicated the provisions would not guarantee the panel's decision would be fully
complied with when he stated, "the enactment of this legislation will not be
the end
of our due diligence to ensure we are allowed to open the border to Mexican
carriers
and in turn, allow American carriers to do business in Mexico."' 62 Other lawmakers,
such as Senator Dorgan of North Dakota, have also indicated that the conditions
attached to the DOT 2002 appropriations bill does not conclude the
issue
surrounding cross-border trucking services. Senator Dorgan opposes the entry
of
Mexican trucks beyond the border area and stated the issue "will be part
of the
interest of others of us in the Congress who still believe it will be unsafe to have
any
wholesale movements of Mexican trucks beyond the 20-mile border limit."' 63
Both
positions demonstrate the volatility of the long-debated and highly-anticipated
issue
of the U.S. compliance with the NAFTA panel's decision under international
political pressure, obligations the United States agreed to approximately
a decade
ago, to internal domestic pressures. Additionally, the provisions attached
to
accepting Mexican carriers could arguably be considered a violation of NAFTA's
most favored nation requirements if the exact same provisions do not apply
to
Canadian trucks entering the United States.
While such an argument can be made, the current administration believes
the
DOT bill would satisfy the NAFTA agreement. The panel indicated the
United
States was not required to treat Mexican trucking companies in the exact manner
as
U.S. and Canadian trucking firms, although Mexican companies should be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. "6 When implemented, the policy signed into
law by
President Bush will allow his administration to fulfill the agreement negotiated
by
his father's administration and signed into law by President Clinton, i.e. lifting
the
blanket moratorium preventing Mexican trucking firms from operating in the
United
States. Congress ensured the law provides a workable compromise for valid
public
interest from both sides of the debate while still fulfilling the
panel's
recommendations that indicated the United States could impose differing
safety
requirements if the different requirements are "made in good faith with respect
to
a legitimate safety concern."' 6 5
C. Impact on Future Trade Agreements
The fact that the United States failed to take adequate measures to lift
the
moratorium in 1995, as originally scheduled, may already have a lasting effect
when
the United States seeks to enter future trade agreements. The longer the period
of
troublesome. In response to these concerns, however, the administration has
assured us the agreement is not in
violation of NAFTA." (referring to a letter from United States Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick printed in id.)).
162. 147 CONG. REC. S12336 (Dec. 4, 2001). Senator McCain was one of
two Senators to vote against the
Appropriations bill, although probably for other reasons than the issue surrounding
the trucking dispute. The
Congressional Record reflects Senator McCain's clear support for opening
United States borders "consistent with
our obligations under NAFTA while protecting the safety of the American
traveling public." Id. at 12336-39. The
Record also indicates Senator McCain's clear disenchantment with the
"egregious process of pork barrel
earmarking," which presumably was his ultimate reason for voting against
the bill. Id. at S 12336-39.
163. 147 CONG. REc. S12335 (Dec. 4,2001). Senator Dorgan goes on to say,
"I think that will not and cannot
be the last word on this subject. Those on the authorizing committee and those
of us who will return to this subject
in the appropriations process next year will have more to say." Id.
164. Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 4, 300.
165. Id. 301.
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time the United States takes to implement the necessary policies to comply with the
panel's decision can only encourage caution by future governments wishing to
negotiate trade with the United States. Any further alterations to the U.S. policy
toward its obligations to NAFTA that may be inconsistent with the panel's
recommendations will have a lasting impact when the United States negotiates
future trade pacts. Opponents of free trade may believe it results in globalization that
is harmful to the world's environment and labor forces; however, international trade
is an inevitable force of the future. The benefits of free trade and controlled growth
are tremendous,166 especially when accompanied with respect for labor and the
environment. The bottom line is that trade is an inevitable part of the future, and the
United State's best interest is to ensure it does not fall into a policy of isolationism.
This is especially true when the world is full of over one hundred thirty regional free
trade and customs agreements, and the United States is party to only three. 67
Several of the Congressional representatives from U.S.-Mexico Border States
support the NAFTA provisions to open the borders to the Mexican trucking industry
and the boost it will provide to commerce in their communities. 68 Cities such as San
Antonio are already poised for the economic benefits anticipated with cross-border
trucking. 169 Additionally, New Mexico, with its Santa Teresa Border Crossing and
cities such as Albuquerque and Las Cruces located on the crossroads of the nation's
major interstates, could possibly reap the benefits of increased commerce resulting
from the opening of the nearby border to the Mexican trucking industry. 7 ' Finally,
United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick recently outlined the
importance of trade in light of the fatal events on September 11, 2001. 71
The failure of the United States to abide by its obligations under NAFTA will
surely discourage other Latin American States from entering the proposed Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which has been eagerly sought by the current
U.S. administration. For these reasons it is important for the United States to be
perceived as a NAFTA party that fulfills its obligations. Senator McCain worded the
concerns surrounding the Mexican trucking dispute and potential effect on the
reputation of the United States by stating,
If our trading partners are subject to the whimsical mood of the appropriators,
how can we ever expect any nation that we have executed a trade agreement
with, or one we are seeking to enter into trade agreements with, to have any faith
that our word is true and we will abide by our agreements? If the appropriators'

166. See NAFTA at Seven, Building on a North American Partnership, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, at http://www.ustr.gov/naftareport/nafta7_brochure-eng.pdf (This brief synopsis of the benefits of
NAFTA after seven years indicates trade between the NAFTA partners had increased by 128 percent and
employment had risen in all three countries as much as 28 percent since the implementation of the Agreement.).
167. Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick before the Committee on Finance of the U.S.
Senate, Feb. 6, 2002.
168. 147 CONG. REC. S12336 (Dec. 4,2001) (statement of Sen. McCain); 147 CONG. REc. H8736 (Nov. 30,
2001) (statement of Rep. Pastor).
169. David Hendricks, Alliance Anticipates Cross-Border Trucking, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss, Jan. 5, 2002.
170. Joel Millman, A Border State Trails in Trade, So Bill Seeks a Post NAFTA Boost, WALL ST. J., May 17,

2001, at A28.
171. Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35.
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agenda had prevailed, I shudder to consider the consequences and the impact as
we attempted to seek to negotiate new trade agreements."I
Finally, Representative Kolbe summarized the entire problem of not complying
with the determinations of an international arbitral panel: "Whether you agree with
NAFTA or not, it is the law of the land and it is an international agreement that we
must uphold....How can we be a global leader by reneging on our agreements? We
can't and we won't.""' These statements clearly indicate the importance of
continuing the long established principles of complying with international law.' 74
VII. CONCLUSION
In a world where borders are becoming more transparent and international trade
more prevalent, the benefits of trade are being felt throughout the globe. The
problems associated with international trade, such as environmental and labor
concerns, must be addressed through sensible controlled growth. Other very
pertinent concerns, such as law enforcement and national security, also cannot be
neglected. All of these factors have played into the political arena surrounding the
U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute. Legitimate safety and national security concerns
exist, especially in light of the tragic events on September 11, 2001; however,
sustained and controlled growth will prevail. The NAFTA trucking dispute between
the United States and Mexico may seem like a minor issue in light of recent world
events; however, the outcome can have major implications on the future
effectiveness of NAFTA and the standing of the United States in the international
trade community. The NAFTA arbitral panel made the correct decision and
recommendations concerning the dispute. Hopefully the current law passed on
December 18, 2001, will result in the actions by the United States to show our
closest trading partners that the United States and its politicians can keep their
promises.

172. 147 CONG. REc. S12336 (Dec. 4, 2001).
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